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CRS- 1 
I SSUE DEFINITION 
On Oct. 2, 1981, President Reagan announced his plan for basing the MX 
missile, as part of a comprehensive proposal on U.S. strategic forces. The 
plan for MX is divided into near- and long-term elements. It would: 
Deploy at least 100 MX missiles in modified 
Titan (and later Minuteman 111) silos, 
hardened to withstand substantially more 
nuclear blast than current silos; 
pursue research and development (R&D) on three 
long-term basing options for MX: continuous 
airborne patrol aircraft, ballistic missile 
defense of land-based MX, and basing deep underground 
or on the south side of mesas: 
"expect to choose among one, or more likely 
several, of these options in 1984." 
The Administration recognizes that silo basing is an interim measure to 
buy time until a more permanent solution is obtained, but contends that it is 
the most effective way to enhance MX survivability in the mid-1980s. The 
Administration further looks toward the three long-term options as promising 
ways of providing security later. 
Critics are likely to challenge both elements, asking: 
-- Can we forgo silo basing and proceed directly 
to a long-term basing mode? 
-- Are the three long-term options under consideration the 
best from which to choose? 
S. 815, the FY82 Defense authorization bill, as reported from conference, 
specifies that no funds may be obligated or spent for developing an 
operational MX basing mode before Nov. 18, 1981, and no funds may be spent 
for that purpose after Nov. 18 i f ,  before then, both Houses agree to 
resolutions disapproving the President's basing mode for MX announced on Oct. 
2. At issue is whether the Congress finds the President's approach for MX 
acceptable, and, if not, what alternatives it might recommend that the 
Administration should pursue. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
There is a consensus that the Reagan MX basing plan and any alternatives 
must meet two broad criteria: 
-- First, it must offer survivability; that is, 
it must give us confidence that some significant 
number of missiles can survive a Soviet attack 
as a militarily effective force. 
-- Second, its costs, social and environmental 
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impacts, effects on our allies, arms control 
ramifications, etc., must be politically 
acceptable. 
This issue brief analyzes the Reagan approach and other prominently 
mentioned alternatives against these criteria. Options covered are: 
Reagan's Plan 
(1) Combining alternatives: strategic force 
diversification. 
(2) Superhard silos. 
( 3 )  Airmobile. 
(4) Antiballistic missiles (ABMs). 
( 5 )  Deep underground basing. 
Low Cost Alternatives 
(6) Decide that ICBMs are invulnerable. 
( 7 )  Base MX in silos, and launch missiles on warning 
of attack. 
(8) Forgo new land-based ICBMs. 
MX Basing Alternatives 
(9) Multiple protective structures (MPS). 
(10) Scaled-down MPS. 
(11) Small submarines. 
New Missiie 
(12) Small ICBMs. 
For more detailed information, see the following issue briefs: MX 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ( 1 ~ 7 7 0 8 0 ) ~  Trident (IB73001), 
Antiballistic Missiles (IB81003), Bomber Options for Replacing B-52s 
(IB811071, The Reagan Plan for U.S. Strategic Forces: Issues for Congress 
(~B81254), and Antisatellites (IB81123), available from CRS; and "MX Missile 
Basing," (Sept. 1981, 335 p .  available from the Office of Technology 
Assessment. See also "Assessing the Options for Preserving ICBM 
Survivability," Report 81-222F, available from CRS. 
REAGAN ' S PLAN 
1. Combining alternatives: strategic force diversification 
While the rest of this Issue Brief treats various options separately, they 
are not mutually exclusive. They could be combined in a diversified force. 
Diversification seeks to respond to Soviet threats by trying several ways 
at once to solve our -strategic force problems, such as ICBM vulnerability. 
The Administration took this approach to strategic forces generally by 
recommending, in addition to both short- and long-term solutions for MX; 
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deployment of submarine-launched cruise missiles as well as Trident 11, and 
ALCM, B-1, and a Stealth bomber. 
The justification for strategic force diversification is the same as for 
the strategic triad: several systems Setter assure survivability, can be 
used for different missions, are harder to attack and defend against, contain 
strengths that offset the weaknesses of any one system, etc. Just as three 
strategic weapons compel the Soviets to spread their resources thinner, 
several ICBM basing modes have the same effect. Pursuing development of 
several hedge programs reduces the time from a deployment decision to initial 
deployment and gives us more understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of 
these systems. As a result, we could confidently select and rapidly deploy 
one or more systems that best respond to the Soviet threat. 
Critics raise several objections. Without rigorous control -- carefully 
balancing the division of expenditures between deployed weapons and R&D 
hedges, procuring only a few of the systems being developed as hedges, 
keeping most of these hedges at modest funding levels -- the cost of the 
entire program (weapons and R&D) would become excessive. In that case, 
hedges designed to generate and advance options would consume so much money 
as to preclude deploying weapons. Political drawbacks pertaining to a 
specific basing mode by itself would also pertain to it as part of a 
diversified force. However, if a specific system were scaled down in size as 
part of a diversification scheme, it might become more politically acceptable 
than if it were being pursued as a single option. Diversification would also 
be harmful if the United States viewed hedge programs in R&D as substitutes 
for deployed forces. 
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Political acceptability: Superhard silos pose only minor social and 
environmental im~acts, and are consistent with existina arms control 
agreements. some6believe that MX missiles deployed in Gulnerable silos 
reduce the stability of the strategic balance because the United States might 
be forced to launch them on warning of Soviet attack. They also argue that 
the Soviets might believe they could successfully attack silo-based MX 
missiles. Either problem would increase the risk of war. Cost is another 
concern. A oreliminarv Air Force estimate as of Oct. 30. 1981. finds that 
RtD and proc;rement of-226 MX missiles (for deployment, ' test, ' and spares) 
will cost $13.8 billion exclusive of nuclear weaoon material: and that 18 
Ti tan silos superhardened and modified for M X L  plus in£ rastructure costs' 
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(e.g., facilities associated with test launches and maintenance equipment) 
will cost $6.2 billion, 36 modified Titan silos plus infrastructure will cost 
$7.8 billion, and 40 modified ~inuteman I11 silos plus infrastructure will 
cost $5.6 billion (all in FY82 dollars). 
Status: This is the option selected by the Administration for first 
deployment of MX. 
3. Airmobile 
Aircraft carrying ICBMs can patrol vast areas and move rapidly; once aloft 
and dispersed, it is essentially impossible to destroy most of them with 
random barrage. It is difficult to destroy a fleet of these aircraft with a 
direct attack on them by other aircraft or by ICBM barrage of an area just 
after an aircraft had been located there by satellite. Existing aircraft, 
however, would be vulnerable if attacked at their bases by submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on depressed (fast) trajectories launched from 
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Status: Two designs have been set forth to remedy both survivability and 
political acceptability problems simultaneously. One, Big Bird, seeks to 
make air loiter less costly. It would be a very large, propeller-driven 
aircraft with glider-like wings that would reportedly use 10% or 20% of the 
fuel of a large jet cargo aircraft. Another aircraft seeks to make ground 
loiter more survivable. The Office of Technology Assessment finds that an 
aircraft hardened to withstand nuclear weapon effects would drastically 
reduce the effectiveness of even the worst SLBM attack, an attack using many 
reentry vehicles (RVs) from SLBMs on fast trajectories launched from 
submarines at the coasts. The Administration plans to conduct R&D on a 
continuous airborne patrol aircraft (without specifying if it would be Big 
Bird or another aircraft) as an option for long-term MX basing. Some House 
and Senate Armed Services Committee leaders are highly critical of airmobile 
basing, on the grounds of cost, vulnerability, and difficulty of operation, 
among other reasons. - The conferees on S. 815, FY82 DOD authorization, agreed 
that no funds authorized by that bill could be used for R&D of an aircraft 
launching mode for MX. 
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Antiballistic missiles (ABMs) 
This concept would use interceptor missiles to destroy Soviet RVs 
attacking U.S. ICBMs. Before the President's Oct. 2 announcement, two 
systems were under consideration. One, Low Altitude Defense (LOAD), would 
use missiles of very short range -- a few kilometers -- to defend MX missiles 
based in MPS. LoAD would be effective, by using the leverage offered by MPS, 
because it would need to intercept only those RVs headed for shelters 
containing MXs or LoAD units. For example, if the Soviets use 23 RVs to 
attack all 23 shelters in an MX cluster containing one MX and one LoAD 
missile, the 'defense, by using the LoAD missile to intercept the RV headed 
for the MX, ,defeats the attack. Still not knowing the location of the MX, 
the Soviets would need to use another 23 RVs, one per shelter, to destroy the 
shelter containing the missile. LoAD is the U.S. ABM that copld be deployed 
most rapidly, in the mid-1980s. In defending U.S. silos, though, LoAD could 
be readily overwhelmed, according to OTA. 
Another type of ABM cduld be used to defend silo-based ICBMs. This 
system, layered defense, would have two tiers. An "overlay" of long-range 
missiles, each with multiple nonnuclear warheads, would intercept RVs in 
space, above 300,000 ft. This overlay is in early experimental stages. The 
"underlay" is simply LoAD or a similar system. Layered defense would seek 
leverage by having the overlay weaken the attack so much that the underlay 
could cope with remaining RVs. 
Survivability: The case was made that LoAD would defend MPS effectively, 
since its task was quite modest (force the Soviets to use an extra RV per 
shelter) and it did not have to work well to do that. Layered defense, 
though, is frontier technology. The overlay would have to work very well for 
layered defense to be effective, yet there are a great many questions about 
whether it could differentiate between RVs and decoys, and otherwise avoid 
being overwhelmed. It will take several years at least to resolve these 
questions. 
Political acceptability: The most significant question in this category 
is that the ABM Treaty of 1972 forbids all but a very small and militarily 
effective system. The desirability of the treaty has aroused a sharp and 
complex debate on ABM stretching back to 1969 and earlier. 
Status: Under the Administration plan, ABM would be one option for 
further R&D for long-term MX basing. The Administration noted, "Any 
ground-based scheme [for basing MX] ultimately would require a ballistic 
missile defense for survivability. But today, ballistic missile defense 
technology is not at the stage where it could provide an adequate defense 
against Soviet missiles." The Administration also raised four questions: 
How well ABM would work, how much it would cost, how Soviet ABMs would affect 
U.S. and allied offensive capabilities, and the political ramifications of 
altering the ABM Treaty. By ending MPS, the Administration has foreclosed 
any justification for a rapid deployment of LoAD. If the United States is to 
deploy any ABM to defend superhard silos, sandy silos, or hard tunnels, 
layered defense must be the ABM used. But layered defense is much further 
from deployment than LoAD. The Administration has thus in effect put off the 
possibility of ABM deployment for at least several years. Given this, it is 
difficult to see what would be gained before then by seeking to renegotiate 
the ABM Treaty or, failing that, abrcgating it to defend MX. 
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5.. Deep underground basinq 
This concept would place MX missiles so far underground that even direct 
hits by Soviet weapons could not destroy them. There are at least two 
variants. In one, "pencil pusher" or "sandy silo," silos would be dug 
several thousand feet deep. Each would have one or several capsules 
containing a missile. The top of the capsule would be shaped like a pencil 
point; a gas generator would push the capsule up with a force of 7,000 psi to 
penetrate through the crater left by a nuclear explosion. A second method, 
"hard tunnel," "citadel," or "underground missile complex," envisions 
excavating a cavern in the middle of a hard rock mountain. Tunnels would be 
dug out from the cavern to near the surface. The system would probably need 
people to operate it, though it might be possible to have it completely 
automated. After attack, excavation equipment stored inside the mountain 
would dig the tunnels out to the surface so the missiles could be launched. 
Survivability: These types of basing will probably protect the missiles 
in an attack. It is unclear, though, if the missi1e.s can survive as an 
operational, launchable force. They could not be launched rapidly; until 
more research is done, no one can know if launch from hard tunnels would take 
hours or months, a DOD study finds. The ability to maintain communication 
with the missiles is uncertain. Atmospheric nuclear tests are barred by the 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Without such tests, it may prove impossible 
to assess with confidence the hardness of the hard tunnel system or to know 
if missiles could push through the debris of bomb craters. 
Political acceptability: Once completed, this system would have very 
little public interface. The cost is uncertain; it could be low for sandy 
silos but high for tunnels drilled in hard rock, though use of preexisting 
mining tunnels might reduce costs. Verifiability for arms control is 
uncertain. 
Status: This is one option for further R&D under the Administration plan. 
The key question is, Will R&D resolve the great technical uncertainties of 
these systems? 
LOW COST ALTERNATIVES 
6. Decide that ICBMs are invulnerable 
If ICBMs are not as vulnerable to Soviet attack as popularly believed, 
then modernizing our ICBM force may be unnecessary. The fundamental question 
of whether or not ICBMs are vulnerable divides in two,: 
a. Can one RV destroy one ICBM silo ("single-RV issues")? One position 
says no, because many error sources degrade ICBM (and SLBM) accuracy below 
that needed to destroy a silo. Each missile trajectory encounters unique 
magnetic and gravity anomalies. They would affect an operational trajectory 
and accuracy to an unknown extent unless we correct for them by flying a 
missile over that trajectory toward the U.S.S.R., which we cannot do. 
Weather would affect accuracy. The Air Force counters that such problems 
have been examined closely for 20 years. Satellites and on-site surveys 
detect gravity and magnetic anomalies for operational trajectories. Firing 
ballistic missiles over many paths has indicated "no significant trajectory' 
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dependent error sources." Weather data for a target can be fed into 
Minuteman 11s before launch. This capability is useful for refining accuracy 
because RVs from these missiles are more sensitive to atmospheric influences 
than are Minutemen I11 RVs. Former Defense Secretary Brown said in Sept. 
1981, "By the late 1980ts, you'll be able to have a warhead come down right 
in the middle of the silo cover." 
b. Can one ICBM force destroy another ("ICBM-force issues")? Conclusions 
one draws about a single RV attacking a single ICBM do not automaticallv 
apply to one ICBM force's attacking another.- For example, the explosion oi 
one RV can destroy, disable, or knock off course following RVs. To avoid 
this "fratricide," RVs must be swept from one side of a missile field to 
another with split-second timing, or all RVs must explode over a missile 
field at the same instant. Two RVs should be used per shelter to compensate 
for imperfect reliability; they should come from different ICBMs so one 
missile's failure does not leave a silo unattacked. Thus hundreds of 
missiles must be launched on precise schedules and put their RVs on precise 
trajectories. This task cannot be practiced, reducing a nation's confidence 
that it can destroy the opposing ICBM force. The reliability of a type of 
ICBM, as calculated from previous tests, may not be the reliability for an 
actual attack. Even if the attack goes as planned, the United States could 
launch its ICBMs while Soviet ICBMs were enroute. 
.The rebuttal to this argument is that we should not rest ICBM 
survivability on Soviet difficulties in destroying U.S. ICBMs; Soviet, not 
U.S., calculations on this point affect Soviet actions. The issue is not i f  
ICBM-force issues will deter a Soviet bolt from the blue; that course poses 
overwheiming hazards. Rather, how would the Soviets calculate the advantages 
of attacking U.S. ICBMs in a deep crisis, where a limited attack might 
appear the least bad option? Relying on our calculations of Soviet 
calculations under terrible pressure is too risky. 
The debate so far has not differentiated between single-RV and ICBM-force 
issues. Yet the former are critical in deciding how to base MX. If Congress 
finds that single-RV issues guarantee ICBM survivability, then the MX basing 
debate could end at that point. If Congress finds this is not the case, 
however, it would have to rest the full burden of ICBM survivability on 
ICBM-force issues, e.g., difficulties the Soviets may have in coordinating an 
attack. 
Survivability: If one believes that our ICBMs are not vulnerable to an 
attack by Soviet strategic nuclear forces, then survivability is not a 
problem. 
Political acceptability: If this approach works, its absence of social 
and environmental impact, dollar cost, and adverse consequences for SALT make 
it highly acceptable. 
Status: The majority opinion in the public debate is that there is a 
reasonable expectation that our ICBMs as currently based are or soon will be 
vulnerable to Soviet attack. Arguments critical of this opinion are still 
being raised. 
7. Base MX in silos, and launch it on warning of attack 
Description: Heat-sensing satellites can detect ICBM launches, and radar 
can track RVs. Observable signs associated with an attack could thus let usv 
CRS- 8 IB81165 UPDATE-11/02/81 
launch ICBMs on warning of attack. This course is available now, DOD notes. 
It is the fastest way to close the window of vulnerability. Enhancing our 
command, control, and communication (C3) ability for our ICBM force would 
make launch on warning (LOW) more credible whether or not we declare it to be 
our policy. 
Supporters of LOW argue that no basing amode assuredly lets land-based 
ICBMs survive attack. Further, it avoids the costs and problems of a complex 
system like MPS, airmobile MX, or ABM. With LOW, we can salvage the maximum 
military value from our ICBMs. We can have very high confidence that LOW 
would work. With LOW, of course, MX would not remain operational for weeks 
after an attack, but we do not need that capability because SLBMs can endure. 
Supporters also note the alternative to LOW, having iCBMs vulnerable during 
the 1980s, is not risk-free. 
Critics charge that LOW entails huge risks that can never be eliminated. 
Launching when there was no attack would cause Armageddon by computer. If 
the Soviets believed we would LOW, they would realize that false warning 
could lead to a U.S. bolt-from-the-blue attack, destroy,ing most of their 
ICBMs. They could respond by adopting their own LOW policy. U.S. security 
would then depend on Soviet computers not erring. I f  we fail to LOW in a 
real attack, the Soviets could destroy almost all of our ICBMs. They could 
exploit the weaknesses of LOW. If we depend on LOW, DOD argues, "the Soviets 
would surely devise ways to blind our warning system in a precursor attack." 
Wouid the President find absence of warning data adequate basis for launching 
ICBMs? We should not require the President to make that choice, but should 
buy survivable forces instead. 
Survivability: LOW would provide survivability. OTA finds that "sensors 
anci communications could ... make at least the technical elements of the 
[launch under attack] capability exceedingly difficult... to disrupt." 
Political acceptability: The costs of LOW are modest, and social, 
environmental, and SALT impacts are negligible. Serious questions about its 
effect on increasing the risk of nuclear war, however, have made LOW 
difficult to accept. 
Status: The United States has neither declared LOW to be our policy nor 
acquired the equipment and procedures needed to have high confidence in a LOW 
policy. Secretary Brown said in the FY82 DOD annual report that "while the 
Soviets cannot ignore our capability to launch our retaliatory forces before 
an attack reaches its targets, we cannot afford to rely on 'launch on 
warning' as the long-term solution to ICBM vulnerability." [emphasis in 
original] The Reagan plan calls for enhanced C3, which will probably reduce 
Soviet confidence that we would not LOW. This might enhance deterrence while 
increasing the risk of accidental war. Some Members of Congress have 
proposed LOW as at least an interim solution to ICBM vulnerability. 
8. Foreqo new land-based ICBMs 
This option would concede that land-based ICBMs cannot be made survivable. 
It would not deploy MX at all, would probably leave existing Minutemen in 
place, and would strengthen the bomber and submarine forces. Bomber forces 
would be diversified by proceeding with air-launched cruise missiles, B-1, 
and later an advanced technology ("Stealth") bomber. Submarine forces would 
be upgraded by deploying the D-5 variant of the Trident I1 missile, the 
largest missile that could fit into Trident submarine launch tubes. The. 
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Trident submarine/~rident 11 system could be designed to provide prompt 
counterforce capability if the decision were made to do so. 
Submarine-launched cruise missiles might also be deployed on attack 
submarines. Since this method would emphasize submarines, the United States 
would hedge against a Soviet breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare by 
conducting R&D on antisubmarine warfare countermeasures. In addition, the 
United States might bring to the point of deployment several systems, such as 
ASM defense of ICBMs, aircraft and small submarines able to carry ICBMs, and 
small ICBMs, and deploy them i f  the Soviet threat to our submarines 
warranted. 
Survivability: The Office of Technology Assessment, in its study of MX 
missile basing, "could find no existing technology, and no technology is 
believed to be on the horizon, which offers any promise for permitting an 
effective Soviet attack on a fleet of small MX-carrying submarines." 
Poseidon and Trident submarines are generally thought to be more survivable 
than small submarines. 
Political acceptability; The major objection to this plan is that it 
would end the strategic triad as we know it, which consists of bombers, 
submarines, and ICBMs. This triad has a number of benefits, as noted above, 
and U.S. policymakers are comfortable with it. In addition, moving to a dyad 
would alter the current division of roles and missions within the services in 
a way that the Air Force would strongly oppose. 
Status: There is little interest in this approach in the Congress or the 
Administration. 
MX BASING ALTERNATIVES 
9. Mxltiple protective structures (MPS) 
In Sept. 1979, President Carter recommended basing 200 MX in 4,600 MPS. 
This is also the system the Air Force prefers. 
Generically, MPS is a giant shell game in which few missiles are moved 
among many shelters. The shelters may be horizontal or vertical and may be 
connected by roads, railroads, or tunnels. The theory underlying MPS is that 
the Soviets would not know which shelters contain missiles, so they would 
have to attack all the shelters in a first strike. Yet the United States 
would build so many shelters that they couldn't attack them all. As a 
result, some shelters and missiles would survive. The Soviets, knowing this, 
would be deterred. 
MPS works if we can meet two conditions. We must keep the Soviets from 
knowing which shelters contain missiles; otherwise, the leverage sought by 
proliferating shelters disappears because they could attack 200 instead of 
4,600 shelters and overwhelm the system. Second, since MPS provides 
survivability only if the Soviets cannot destroy most of the shelters, the 
United States must build more shelters than they can attack, defend shelters 
with ABMs, or both. 
MPS advocates argue that we could probably prevent the Soviets from 
knowing which shelters contain missiles. We would build decoys so each 
shelter would appear to hold a missile. We would have a team of experts,. 
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shelters with missiles because of the consequences if they were wrong. 
Critics note that there are a dozen or more observable features of 
missiles in shelters, such as mass and heat. I f  the Soviets could 
differentiate on even one, they could learn which shelters hold missiles. 
Since the U.S. is an open society, they could complement satellite data with 
information obtained from agents on the ground. 
The issue of building enough shelters to offset Soviet RVs at a specified 
future time depends on our intelligence estimates of the number of RVs they 
will have available to attack MPS at that time and on our willingness to 
build the required number of shelters and/or defend them with ABM. OTA 
estimates that, i f  the Soviets choose, they could target 7,000 RVs on MPS in 
1990 and 12,000 in 1995. To enable 100 MX missiles to survive, we would need 
8,250 MPS in 1990 and 12,500 in 1995. On the other hand, MX might force them 
to spend more resources on protecting their ICBMs and less on increasing the 
threat to MX. MPS advocates argue that we could add shelters and/or defend 
them with ABM; critics point to the political resistance that the 4,600-MPS 
system met and doubt that we could build still more shelters. 
Survivability: If the Soviets do not know which shelters contain missiles 
and if  they do sot have enough RVs to destroy most shelters, MPS would -
prcvide survivability. 
Political acceptability: The more shelters we build, the higher the 
dollar cost and societal/environmental impact. The commitment to add 
shelters to offset Soviet RVs raises the prospect of unending impacts if the 
Soviets continue to add RVs. An ABM defense can avoid the need to add 
shelters and the associated impacts, but would require additional costs and 
force the United States to renegotiate or withdraw from the ABM Treaty. So 
doing would raise questions about the future of arms control and U.S. 
strategic policy. 
Status: Given the diverse opposition MPS had already encountered, the 
Administration's rejection of MPS appears to end prospects for this basing 
mode. 
10. Scaled-down MPS 
Press reports indicate the Administration considered basing 100 MX in 
1,000 MPS. This system by itself would reduce the cost, societal and 
environmental impact, and survivability below those of 200-MX/4,600-MPS. If 
it were the first installment on a larger system, it could provide increased 
survivability along with increased cost and impact, though if we delay a 
decision on system size and if  the Soviets add many silo-killer RVs, it is 
uncertain if  we could later build enough shelters fast enough to attain MX 
survivability by 1990, for example. 
Survivability: This system, by itself, fails. The Soviets could readily 
target two RVs on each shelter. If each RV has an 85% chance of destroying 
its target, as .OTA estimates, then only 15% of 15% of the missiles -- 2.25 
missiles -- would survive. 
Political acceptability: Better than for 200 MX in 4,600 MPS. 
Status: The Reagan plan's cancellation of MPS would appear to end future 
efforts toward even a scaled-down MTS. 
11. Small submarines 
This system would involve 50 or so World War I1 sized diesel electric 
submarines, each carrying two or four MX or other missiles horizontally in 
canisters outside the pressure hull. On command, canisters would separate 
from the submarine and float to the surface, where the missile would be 
ignited. The missiles could have very good accuracy by using navigation 
satellites, ground radio beacons, or star sights. Submarines would have a 
patrol range of 500-1500 nmi, but this could be extended. They would not 
operate above the continental shelf to avoid being destroyed by very large 
waves caused by underwater detonation of nuclear weapons just off the 
continental shelf. 
Survivability: In its study on MX missile basing, the Office of 
Technology Assessment "could find no existing technology, and no technology 
is believed to be on the horizon, which offers any promise for permitting an 
effective Soviet attack on a fleet of small MX-carrying submarines." It 
could not exclude the possibility of an unforeseeable antisubmarine warfare 
IASW) advance, but noted that even in that case the differences between 
Trident and small submarines could impede destroying both submarine forces 
simultaneously. Critics argue that concentrating submarines off the coasts 
increases vulnerability, but even so detection would be difficult, submarines 
could be defended, operating areas could be expanded, and other techniques 
(replacing diesel propulsion with fuel cells to avoid snorkeling, deploying 
noise generators under water to impede Soviet ASW, etc.) could further reduce 
vulnerability. Survivability against known or foreseeable threats and the 
probable ability to counter unforeseeable threats is about as much 
survivability as can be hoped for. 
There is a dispute over the importance the United States should attach to 
unforeseen threats to small submarines. The United States has hedged against 
a Soviet ability to destroy its deterrent force by building three independent 
strategic forces. With fixed-site ICBMs becoming vulnerable, the United 
States could continue hedging by redressing the vulnerability of land-based 
ICBMs, the most vulnerable force, or by deploying small submarines to upgrade 
the survivability of strategic submarines, the least vulnerable force. (Both 
could be done, but at high cost.) The choice poses quite different risks -- 
for land-based ICBMs, that the Soviets will be able to overwhelm or otherwise 
defeat whatever basing mode we choose; and for small submarines, that the 
Soviets will make dramatic and unforeseen advances in ASW. 
political acceptability: The triad concept, which by now has become 
deeply embedded in U.S. thought, and the current division of roles and 
missions among the services would make it difficult for the United States to 
abandon land-based ICBMs in favor of small submarines. 
Some view small submarine basing as posing arms control problems. If 
encapsulated ICBMs could be placed on small diesel submarines, they could be 
placed on most ships, making verification difficult if  not impossible. 
Critics believe the system would be more expensive than is generally 
realized because of "hidden costs," such as ships and planes to defend the 
submarines. Advocates respond that small submarines should be less costly 
than MPS. While they do not consider hidden costs, they note that other 
systems have such costs as well. 
Status: This is a system in search of a home. I t  marks too radical a 
break with existing systems and existing divisions of roles and missions for 
the services to accept. The Navy has never favored it, and the Air Force has 
strenuously opposed it. The concept has been modified over the past two 
years to increase survivability and cost-effectiveness, leading to a larger 
submarine with more patrol range. Small submarines have become more like 
Tridents, critics note; they question the advantages of proceeding with both. 
Small submarine basing was not an option chosen by the Administration for 
further RLD.  It thus appears out of  the running, at least in the eyes of the 
Administration. 
NEW MISSILE 
12. Small ICBMs 
This plan would deploy ICBMs much smaller than MX in one or several basing 
modes in addition to or instead of MX. One proposed small ICBM would weigh 
22,000 lb and would be 38 ft long, vs. 192,000 lb and 70.5 it for MX. 
Another would be 50 ft long and weigh 20,000 to 30,000 lb. Both small ICBMs 
would carry a single warhead. The smaller of the two could be deployed on 
tractor-trailer trucks; both could be deployed on medium-sized cargo 
aircraft, barges, etc. 
The rationale for small ICBMs is that MX is too large to be survivable on 
land, where it can be based only in silos or MPS. Yet given current and 
projected Soviet ICBM accuracy, any fixed target can be destroyed. Land 
basing, however, is desirable to balance the triad, to enable rapid response 
to launch commands, etc. Only a mobile missile would have any chance of 
avoiding detection, and a missile must be small to be mobile. 
Survivability: Small ICBMs appear survivable. In 1979, there were 
1,339,000 tractor-trailer units in service in the United States. It would be 
difficult for the Soviets to barrage all the interstate highways: when other 
roads are added, the task becomes formidable indeed. Thus, if trucks 
carrying small ICBMs could be made to appear like other tractor-trailers, the 
Soviets would face an extremely difficult targeting problem. 
Political acceptability: The major concerns are public interface, SALT, 
and cost. The pblic would probably oppose deploying nuclear missiles on 
highways. Questions would also arise about making any area of the nation a 
potential strategic target, safety in the event of an accident, and security 
from terrorist attacks. 
A decision to deploy both MX and small ICBMs would violate the SALT I1 
provision permitting each side one new type of ICBM. Further, SALT 11 
imposes limits on missiles and launchers but not on warheads. These limits 
place small ICBMs at a tremendous disadvantage. While MX carries 10-12 RVs, 
a small ICBM would carry only one. Yet launchers of each would count equally 
toward the aggregate .ceiling of 2,250 heavy bombers, air-to-surface ballistic 
missiles, and launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs (Article 111, paragraphs 1 and 2). 
Given this provision, deploying small ICBMs would thus reduce the number o f  
RVs the United States could deploy. 
The cost would depend on the basing mode; deploying 3,000 small ICBMs in 
hard silos would be costly (and would entail many of the social and 
environmental impacts of MPS), but deploying a few hundred small ICBMs on 
trucks would be much less expensive. 
Small ICBMs would also raise a dispute over verifiability. Road-mobile 
small ICBMs could rely for survival on indistinguishability from a large 
number of civilian vehicles, although the same characteristic would impede 
verification for arms control purposes. SALT supporters argue that 
verifiability is critical to arms control agreements, and that these 
agreements are essential to limiting Soviet strategic forces. 
SALT critics, many of whom would support small ICBMs, respond that SALT 
has limited launchers because they are readily verifiable, and that it is 
limiting the wrong things. Instead, they argue, the United States should try 
to negotiate limits on other measures of military capability -- missiles, 
throw weight of missiles, and number of warheads per missile, for example -- 
even though those items are harder to verify. If the Soviet Union will not 
agree to these limits, they would urge that the United States abandon SALT 
and move to a new "arms control" regime. In it, weapons would be limited not 
by formal agreements but by deploying weapons such as small ICBMs that give 
the Soviets no incentive to add to their ICBM force and give us no concern if 
they do; their missiles would be of no use in attackiqg small ICBMs they 
couidn't locate. 
Status: These missiles are in conceptual design stages only. This option 
has attracted only modest public and Congressional attention. The ~ i r  Force 
Ballistic Missile Office has reportedly solicited sources for an advanced 
development program to examine small ICBMs. 
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